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Case No. 20080435-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Armand Kwanza Brown, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from an order for restitutition on a conviction for burglary 
and aggravated assault. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78 A-4-
103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Does the judgment incorrectly reflect a conviction for aggravated burglary 
where Defendant unambiguously pleaded guilty to simple burglary? 
Standard of Review. The State concedes that the case should be remanded for 
the entry of a corrected judgment for burglary on Count I. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that defendant pay 
restitution for the victim's relocation costs stemming from a battery and assault? 
Standard of Review. 'Trial courts are vested with wide latitude and discretion 
in sentencing,. . . and we will not disturb a trial court's restitution order unless it 
exceeds that prescribed by law or otherwise abused its discretion." State v. Corbitt, 
2003 UT App 417, f 6,82 P.3d 211 (citations omitted). '"[T]he exercise of discretion 
in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the 
appellate court can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable 
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court/" Id. (quoting State v. 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)) (brackets in original). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are attached at Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-25a-403, -408, -411 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-7-503 (West Supp. 2008); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-101 (West 2004), -102, -302 (West Supp. 2008); 
Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, no 
contact order violation, assault, and damage to or interruption of a communication 
device. Rl-2. He waived a preliminary hearing and was bound over. R23. 
Defendant pleaded guilty to burglary and aggravated assault, and the State agreed 
2 
to dismiss the remaining charges. R26. The trial court ordered a presentence 
investigation report and, later, a diagnostic evaluation. R24, 39.! 
On August 24, 2007, the court sentenced defendant to a one-to-fifteen-year 
term on the burglary conviction and a zero-to-five-year term on the aggravated 
assault conviction. R57. The court suspended both prison terms, placed defendant 
on probation for thirty-six months, and ordered defendant to pay full restitution. 
R57-58. The judgment directed the State to submit an order for restitution within 
180 days. R58. 
On April 25, 2008, 185 days after defendant was sentenced, the State 
submitted a motion and order for restitution to the victims in the amount of 
$2,970.72. R61-64. Attached to the motion and order were Restitution/Subrogation 
Notices from the Office of Crime Victims Reparations (OCVR) detailing 'Verified 
expenses incurred by the victims/' R65-69. Following a hearing, on April 18,2008, 
the court ordered defendant to pay restitution in the amount requested. R89. 
Defendant timely appealed the restitution order. R91. 
A copy of the presentence investigation report is contained in an 
unnumbered envelope; the diagnostic evaluations of Aaron M. Zimmer, Adult 
Probation and Parole Investigator, and Tanya Colledge, Psy. D., are contained in a 
numbered envelope (R48). Those documents are cited as "PSI," "DEV/Z," and 
"DEV/C," respectively. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
The Incident 
The Probable Cause Statement describes Defendant's offenses: 
"The City of South Salt Lake served a No Contact Order, case #C06-01657, on 
the Defendant, ARMAND KWANZ A BROWN, on June 13,2006, which was still in 
effect on January 23,2007. See Probable Cause Statement, R3. The No Contact order 
states that the Defendant will have absolutely no personal contact with Cheree 
Weatherspoon." Id. 
"Spring Weatherspoon states that on January 23, 2007, the Defendant, 
ARMAND KWANZA BROWN, came to her home at 2803 South Adams Street, Salt 
Lake County, where she lives with her daughter, Cheree Weatherspoon. Id. The 
Defendant started banging on the door and windows wanting Cheree to open the 
door. Id. Cheree opened the door and told the Defendant to leave. Id. The 
Defendant walked in the house, uninvited, and hit Cheree in the face. Id. When 
Spring tried to intervene, the Defendant hit Spring with a radio, and threw a 
drinking glass at her. Id. The glass cut Spring's hand. Spring had a laceration on 
her hand." Id. 
The facts are taken from the probable cause statement (R3-4), the 
presentence investigation report (PSI), the diagnostic evaluations (DEV/Z and 
DEV/C), a memorandum written by Mr. Zimmer on August 21,2007 (R49), and the 
transcript of the sentencing and the restitution hearings (R107). 
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'The Defendant walked outside and Cheree shut the door. Id. The Defendant 
started yelling at Cheree to open the back door. Id. Cheree would not open the 
door, so the Defendant kicked in the back door and entered the home/7 Id. 
'The Defendant started beating on Cheree and threatened to kill her. As 
Officers arrived, the Defendant ran on foot, taking Cheree's cell phone with him so 
that she could not call the police/' R4. 
Both victims were transported to St. Marks Hospital for their injuries. PSI:3. 
Defendant is six feet tall and weighs approximately 245 pounds. DEV/G2. 
The Legal and Factual Bases of the Guilty Plea 
In pleading guilty, Defendant admitted that, as to burglary, "[he] entered or 
remained unlawfully in the dwelling of another with intent to commit assault/7 
R27. He also admitted that, as to aggravated assault, "[he] threatened with the use 
of unlawful force causing bodily injury to another." Id. The factual basis for the 
pleas was that he "entered the home of his girlfriend without permission and got in 
a fight with her mother, Spring Weatherspoon, who received a cut to her hand/ ' Id. 
ThePSI 
While being evaluated by Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P), Defendant was 
involved in a fight with another inmate, which resulted in his being housed in the 
Salt Lake County Jail's Maximum Security pod. PSL2. The investigator reported as 
follows: "During the interview, the Defendant accepted little responsibility for his 
actions in this matter. He blamed the victims for attacking him by jumping on him, 
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and throwing water and a glass jar at him. It is clear the Defendant has an anger 
problem and is quick to exhibit violent behavior/' PSL2. 
The investigator's opinion concerning Defendant's anger problem and 
propensity to act violently is supported by Defendant's adult criminal record: 
Date 
• 4/23/02 
• 8/30/04 
• 12/23/04 
• 1/28/06 
• 6/19/06 
• 9/14/06 
• 1/25/07 
Offense 
Battery/spouse 
Battery/Fmr spouse 
Battery 
Interfering W/Police, Misd 
Obstructing justice, Misd 
Simple Assault, MA 
Viol Prot Order, MA 
Threat Against Life/Prop, MA 
Viol No Contact Order, MA 
Interfere W/Police, MB 
False Info to Police, MC 
Agg Burglary, F2 
Agg Assault, F3 
Disposition 
Convicted 
No information 
Warrant 
No information 
Plea in abeyance 
Dismissed 
Dismissed 
Convicted 
Convicted 
Convicted 
Current case 
PSI:4. 
Also, an order to show cause had issued on Defendant's 2006 plea in abeyance 
on simple assault. PST.4. 
Defendant admitted that he entered Cheree's home because he was upset 
with her: "The reason this all happened was because I was coming to her house off 
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of work and I had seen a black guy parking outside of the house and I thought that 
she was seeing him steady me [sic] trying to talk to her I just started yelling and one 
thing led to another " PSL3. 
AP&P recommended that Defendant be ordered to complete a 60-day 
Diagnostic Evaluation at the Utah State Prison. PSI:1. 
The Diagnostic Evaluations 
Defendant was arrested and booked into jail on January 25, 2007, and he 
remained in custody until sentencing, on August 24,2007. R39-40,56; DEV/Z:1. On 
June 1,2007, the court ordered that Defendant receive a diagnostic evaluation. R39. 
In her evaluation, Dr. Tanya Colledge noted Defendant's history of violence: 
Defendant reported "a history of having been suspended for fighting" in high 
school and of "domestic violence with a former girlfriend." DEV/C4. She noted 
that Defendant "does not exhibit a normal regard for traditional social standards 
and values," and that he "likely has a history of difficulty w i th . . . the legal system. 
Id. at 4. Dr. Colledge commented that Defendant "has developed quite a history of 
violence for someone so young with at least four battery/assault charges and 
several violations of a protective or no contact order." Id. at 5. She opined that 
Defendant "is in need of a significant anger management treatment program." Id. at 
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5. Dr. Colledge's DSM IV diagnostic impression was that Defendant suffered from 
"Personality Disorder NOS with Antisocial Features/' Id.3 
The evaluation of Mr. Zimmer, the Diagnostic Investigator, reflects that 
Defendant failed to personally invest himself in the diagnostic process, refusing to 
disclose much, if any, detail of his crimes or drug use, expressing little empathy for 
his victims, and revealing little comprehension of or insight into how his thinking 
contributed to his criminal lifestyle. DEV/Z:3-4. Among the most prominent of 
Defendant's "thinking errors" was his "criminal anger," which made him 
"aggressive, vengeful, and [ready to] suddenly lash out at innocent victims." Id. at 
4. Mr. Zimmer noted that" [o]ne of the more obvious areas of concern regarding the 
defendant includes his propensity for violence" (id. at 5)—while incarcerated for this 
offense, Defendant was counseled for "strong-arming" and "intimidating other 
inmates." See Mr. Zimmer's Memorandum of August 21, 2007, R49. Mr. Zimmer 
concluded his Evaluative Summary with the following remarks: 
While at the Diagnostic Unit, Mr. Brown's performance, insight, and 
attitude have all been poor. We are not overly optimistic with his 
3
 "DSM" is an abbreviation for "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual." See 
http:/ /www.dsmivtr .org/. "NOS" is an abbreviation for "not otherwise specified." 
See SOCIAL WORKER'S DESK REFERENCE 184 (Albert R. Roberts, Gilbert J. Greene, eds. 
Oxford University Press eds. 2002) ("Each class of disorders [set out in the DSM IV] 
has at least one class of 'not otherwise specified' (NOS) category. This category . . . 
is given when the person has unique features which are within the range of the class 
but do not precisely fit the category.") 
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ability, or desire, to successfully change his life at this time. His 
history, and current attitude and actions suggest he will continue in the 
same pattern. Our concern is with the defendant's increasing risk to 
the community, and believe this must be taken into consideration. 
DEV/Z5 . 
The Sentencing 
At the sentencing, defense counsel referred to the PSI and Mr. Zimmer's 
diagnostic evaluation, but argued that Defendant had not shown anger towards his 
sister or his present girlfriend. R107:l-3. The trial court responded: "Based on his 
history, they are probably the next to get hit/7 Id. at 3. The court recited 
Defendant's criminal record and then summarized: "This is a picture of a man who 
doesn't follow the law, who ignores court orders and who is a big strong bully and 
does, you know, I guess maybe we could say no impulse control which makes him a 
dangerous person, and that's a concern." Id. at 4. The court repeatedly expressed its 
concerns about Defendant's dangerousness throughout the remainder of the 
proceeding: 
• Speaking to Defendant: "My worry is if I give you a chance 
and put you on probation somebody else is going to get hurt. 
M a t 4-5. 
• Responding to defense counsel's minimizing Defendant's 
verbal wrangling with the court: "But even here in Court in 
response to me, he's raising his voice. He's aggressively 
defensive and he's shaking his head again now. Everything 
I'm seeing says this guy's never going to learn." Id. at 7. 
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• Commenting after reading aloud part of Mr. Zimmer's 
Evaluative Summary: "People aren't safe around you, 
Mr. Brown, that's our problem. Id. at 8. 
The Restitution Hearing 
At the restitution hearing, the prosecutor stated that the incident leading to 
the charges constituted domestic violence, "since the Defendant and victim were co-
habitants." Rl 07:12. The prosecutor further stated that Cheree had relocated about 
seven months after the incident "out of fear that the Defendant would retaliate or 
come back again after he got out of custody." Id. The prosecutor reported that the 
Office of Crime Victims Reparations (OCVR) had reimbursed Cheree $1,300 for rent 
and $500 for a deposit. Id. The prosecutor argued that because Defendant "caused 
the victim to lose ... her feeling of safety[,]... it seems reasonable that her choice to 
relocate should be something that would be reimbursed by him, especially since this 
was a case where the crime occurred in the residence where he had formerly lived 
and he would know where to find her again and it was a crime of violence." Id. at 
13. 
Defendant objected, first on the ground that the State's request for restitution 
was filed more than 180 days after sentencing. Id. at 13. He further objected to an 
award to restitution for rent because he had not agreed to pay those costs, nor had 
he admitted or pleaded guilty to criminal conduct that related to those costs. Id. at 
13-14. 
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The trial court recognized that the commitment limited the filing of the 
restitution request to 180 days and that overly extending the request for restitution 
was ''not fair to the defendant/7 Id. at 15. "At the same time/' the court observed, "I 
feel this has been [an] absolutely, entirely appropriate area for restitution/' Id. In 
accord with the OCVR notices, the court ordered Defendant to pay restitution: 
$180.98 to Spring Weatherspoon for her medical expenses; $989.74 to Cheree 
Weatherspoon for her medical expenses and $1,800 for rent and rent deposit. Id. at 
14-16; see R65-68. The trial court attributed the OCVR's compensation to Cheree for 
rent deposit to the probable loss of deposit resulting from Defendant's kicking in the 
door of the victims' home. R107:16. The OCVR notice states that on August 1,2007, 
Cheree was compensated for $650 in rent and $500 in rent deposit, and that on 
September 1, 2007, Cheree was compensated for $650 in rent. R66. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
L 
The state concedes that the judgment incorrectly reflects that Defendant 
pleaded guilty to burglary. The record shows that Defendant pled guilty to 
burglary, a second degree felony, and not to aggravated burglary. After a proper 
plea colloquy and without objection from the State, the trial court accepted 
Defendant's guilty plea to burglary. The case should be remanded for correction of 
the judgment. 
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II. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Defendant to pay 
restitution for the victim's relocation costs. 
Defendant is a 245-pound man with a substantial criminal history of assaults 
and domestic abuse and has, according to the presentence investigator and the 
diagnostic evaluators, a propensity for violence with little insight into his problems 
in managing his anger. He entered the home of his ex-girlfriend in contravention of 
a no contact order, beat her, and threatened her to kill her. He pleaded guilty to 
burglary, admitting that he entered the dwelling with intent to assault, and 
although the aggravated assault conviction reflects his striking the victim's mother, 
the record shows that he entered intending to assault the victim. 
Under the Crime Victims Restitution Act, a crime victim is entitled to 
restitution consisting of pecuniary damages caused by a defendant's criminal 
activity. Contrary to Defendant's arguments, the victim's relocation costs were a 
direct result of his criminal activity. The victim moved out of fear of Defendant's 
retaliating and as soon as the possibility arose that he might be placed on probation. 
The costs of her relocating -two months rent and deposit for her new residence — 
were reasonable and equitable. And in accord with the Act and this Court's case 
law, those costs were allowable pecuniary damages — economic harm in clearly 
12 
ascertainable dollar amounts related to Defendant's criminal activity— even though 
they stemmed from a mental injury — the victim's fear of Defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
THE STATE CONCEDES THAT THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
CORRECTED TO REFLECT THAT DEFENDANT PLEADED 
GUILTY TO BURGLARY 
Defendant correctly claims that the judgment incorrectly states that he was 
convicted of aggravated burglary when, in fact, he entered a guilty plea to simple 
burglary. Aplt. Br. at 6-9. 
Defendant was charged with aggravated burglary, a first degree felony. Rl. 
On March 12, 2007, Defendant entered a guilty plea to "Burglary/' evidenced by 
Defendant's plea statement (Addendum B). R26. The plea statement expressly 
states that the degree of offense is "2° felony/' for which the punishment is "1-15 yrs. 
U.S.P." Id. At the very outset of the change-of-plea hearing and in response to the 
trial court's inquiry as to the status of the case, defense counsel informed the court 
that "what's proposed is that Count I would be amended to reflect burglary, striking 
the aggravated portion." R126:2. Thereafter, without objection by the State and 
after a proper colloquy, the trial court accepted Defendant's guilty plea to burglary: 
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Brown, how do you plead to the charge of 
burglary, a second-degree felony? 
MR. BROWN: Guilty. 
13 
THE COURT: I'll accept your guilty pleas and enter your convictions . . . . 
R126:5. 
In spite of the clear record of defendant's plea to burglary, all of the court's 
proceedings thereafter, including the judgment, incorrectly recite the Count I charge 
as "aggravated burglary (amended) - 2nd degree felony." R36,37,39,51,53,57,87, 
88„ 89,108,110, 111, 112. Accordingly, the case should be remanded to the trial 
court for the entry of a corrected judgment to reflect that, as to Count I, defendant 
was convicted of burglary, and not aggravated burglary. See Rule 30(b), Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure ("Clerical mistakes in judgments . . . may be corrected by the 
court at any time"). 
IL 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY RESTITUTION FOR THE 
VICTIM'S RELOCATION COSTS 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly ordered defendant to pay 
Cheree Weatherspoon's relocation expenses . Aplt. Br. at 10-24. He does not 
challenge restitution ordered for Cheree's and her mother, Spring's, medical 
expenses. Rather, he argues that (1) the court improperly awarded restitution where 
Defendant "did not agree to pay, did not admit responsibility for, and was not 
convicted of conduct relating to relocation expenses" (Aplt. Br. at 15,15-19, 22-24); 
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and; (2) the record fails to support the relocation costs (Aplt Br. at 19-21). The State 
acknowledges that Defendant did not agree to pay for the Cheree's relocation 
expenses. The claim nevertheless fails. The record supports that the Cheree's 
relocation expenses constitute proper pecuniary damages following Defendant's 
civil battery and assault on her, civil actions that arise from defendant's admitted 
criminal activity. 
A, The Crime Victims Restitution Act provides that victims be 
compensated for all losses caused by criminal activity, 
"When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall 
order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this 
chapter . . . . " UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302(l) (West Supp. 2008). See UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-38a~101 (West Supp. 2008) (identifying chapter 38a of the Code as the 
"Crime Victims Restitution Act") ("the Act"). 
"'Criminal activities' means any offense of which the defendant is convicted 
or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the 
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-102(2) (West Supp. 2008). 
"'Restitution' means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages 
to a victim . . . . " UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-102(ll) (West Supp. 2008). 
15 
Defendant pled guilty to burglary and aggravated assault. R26-33. In so 
pleading, Defendant admitted that, as to burglary, [he] entered or remained 
unlawfully in the dwelling of [Cheree Weatherspoon] with intent to commit 
assault." R27. He also admitted that, as to aggravated assault, "[he] threatened 
with the use of unlawful force causing bodily injury to [Spring Weatherspoon]/' Id. 
The factual basis for the pleas was that he "entered the home of his girlfriend 
[Cheree] without permission and got in a fight with her mother, Spring 
Weatherspoon, who received a cut to her hand." Id. Defendant admitted that he 
entered Cheree's home because he was upset with her: "The reason this all 
happened was because I was coming to her house off of work and I had seen a black 
guy parking outside of the house and I thought that she was seeing him steady me 
[sic] trying to talk to her I just started yelling and one thing led to another . . . ." 
PSI:3. That Defendant also struck Cheree in the face, beat her, and threatened to kill 
her, and that Cheree and Spring were transported to a hospital for their injuries, is 
undisputed. R3-4; PSI:3. Nor does defendant dispute that Cheree relocated "out of 
fear that the [Defendant would retaliate or come back again after he got out of 
custody." R107:12. 
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B. Defendant's violent conduct gave rise to civil actions for battery 
and assault. 
Given the foregoing undisputed facts and admissions, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in ordering Defendant to pay restitution—Cheree's "full 
pecuniary damages'" in having to relocate following Defendant's burglary and 
aggravated assault. 
"'Pecuniary damages' means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or 
not yet incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the 
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities . . . but excludes . . . 
pain and suffering." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-102(6) (West Supp. 2008). 
As a result of his admissions and his undisputed criminal conduct, Defendant 
was subject to civil actions for both battery and assault. 
"A battery is an act ' ( a ) . . . intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact 
with the person of the other . . . or an imminent apprehension of such a contact' 
from which '(b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly 
results/" Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 503 n.3 (Utah 1996) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965)). 
Defendant was subject to an action for civil battery. He admitted entering 
Cheree's residence with intent to assault R27. His intent to assault was directed at 
Cheree: he admitted that he entered because he feared she was seeing another man. 
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PSI:3. Defendant does not dispute that he struck Cheree in the face, that he beat her, 
and that she went to the hospital for treatment of her injuries. R3-4. 
Defendant was also subject to an action for civil assault. 
" An assault is an act ' ( a ) . . . intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact 
with the person of the other . . . or an imminent apprehension of such a contact' by 
which ' ( b ) . . . the other is . . . put in such imminent apprehension/" Tiede, 915 P.2d 
at 503 n.3 (Utah 1996) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965)). 
Defendant does not dispute that in the course of his battery he threatened to 
killCherree. R3-4. 
In sum, the record supports that Defendant was subject to civil actions for 
both battery and assault. 
C. The victim was entitled to receive pecuniary damages consisting 
of her relocation costs stemming from her fear of Defendant. 
Defendant does not appear to dispute the availability of these civil actions. 
Aplt. Br. at 15-19. Rather, he argues that the record supporting these actions does 
not justify the recovery of pecuniary damages consisting of Cheree's relocation 
costs, because those costs are both causally unrelated to and temporally remote from 
his admitted criminal conduct. Aplt. Br. at 15-19. Specifically, Defendant argues 
that because he was convicted of burglary and aggravated assault, he could be 
ordered to pay for only "property damaged or destroyed, medical or professional 
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services or care, therapy and rehabilitation, and lost income or wages 'clearly 
resulting7 from those crimes/' Aplt. Br. at 17-18, 20 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
38a-302(5)(b) (West Supp. 2008)). He also argues that the relocation expenses, which 
''purportedly arose on August 1 and September 1, several months after [his] conduct 
in this case . . . are not related to the conduct for which [he] admitted responsibility. 
. . . " Id. Defendant construes the law too narrowly. 
Contrary to Defendant's argument, section 77-38a-302(5)(b), does not limit 
compensation to the crime victim to the items Defendant identifies or to the brief 
time period following the incident that Defendant implicitly suggests. Rather, the 
section provides that "[i]n determining the monetary sum and other conditions for 
complete restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including [those statutory 
items listed by Defendant]." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302(5)(b) (WestSupp. 2008)) 
(emphasis added). Further, "[i]n determining restitution, the court shall determine 
complete restitution" — "the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses 
caused by defendant." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008)) 
(emphasis added). And "pecuniary damages" expressly includes those costs, 
"whether or not yet incurred," as long as they stem from the offender's criminal 
activity. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-102(6). Thus, except as otherwise stated in law, 
restitution reaches as far as a criminal's activity affects his victim in time and 
material impact. 
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"To the extent possible, the fundamental purpose of compensatory damages 
is to place the plaintiff in the same position he would have occupied had the tort not 
been committed/' Avis Vision Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Property Management, Inc. 
2005 UT App 326, ^ 31 n.4,121 P.3d 24 (reviewing proper measure of damages in 
conversion action) (citation omitted), affd, 2006 UT 45,143 P.3d. 278, reh'g denied. 
While Utah's appellate courts have not considered a challenge to restitution for 
relocation costs, other jurisdictions have and concluded that such costs are within 
restitution's proper scope. 
In People v. Meams, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 511 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), Mearns hid in 
the victim's mobile home and then raped her at knifepoint when she returned. Id. at 
513. Before he left, he told the victim that he knew where her son went to school 
and that he would hurt the boy if she talked about his raping her. Id. Mearns was 
arrested about three months after the offense. Id. Out of "constant fear of being 
assaulted again" and "fear of her son's safety," the victim sold her mobile home for 
$13,000 and purchased another for $26,575, sometime after Mearns was arrested. Id. 
at 514. The trial court found that it was reasonable under the circumstances for the 
victim to relocate. Id. at 517. The court awarded the victim $13,575 in restitution, 
the difference between the sale of the victim's original mobile home and the 
purchase price of the new mobile home, noting that "[t]he intent of the Legislature 
is to really make a victim as whole as one can do so in a monetary way . . . ." Id. 
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The California Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court. As in Utah, the 
statute in California provides that "'a victim of crime who incurs any economic loss 
as a result of the commission of a crime shall receive restitution directly from any 
defendant convicted of that crime.'" Id. at 514 (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 1202.4 
(a)(1)). Additionally, unlike any Utah provision, section 1202.4 explicitly authorizes 
restitution for "'[ejxpenses incurred by an adult victim in relocating away from the 
defendant/" Id. (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 1202.4 (f)(3)(I)). Based on these 
provisions, the appellate court upheld the trial court's ruling, holding that it was 
"rational, well-reasoned, based on factual evidence presented at the hearing, and 
within its broad discretion/7 Id. at 517. But the appellate court's decision was not 
based exclusively on the statutory provision for relocation costs: "[P]utting aside 
the specific wording in section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(I), the trial court reasonably 
could have concluded that the increased cost incurred in the [victim's] move was an 
'economic loss' within the general language of the first sentence of section 1202.4, 
subdivision (f)[ — restitution is to be awarded for economic loss "as a result of the 
defendant's conduct."] Id.4 The court reasoned: 
4
 The first sentence of subsection (f) provides: "In every case in which a 
victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct, the court 
shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an 
amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the 
victim . . . . " Cal. Penal Code § 1202.4 (f). 
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[The victim] moved in order to prevent defendant from finding her 
again and reduce the fears engendered by the very mobilehome 
[sic]where she was sexually assaulted at knifepoint. The trial court 
could reasonably conclude that the enormous emotional trauma 
resulting from the attack was such that Susan F. virtually had to move 
and this was an "economic loss" resulting from defendant's conduct 
without relying on the more specific language in section 1202.4, 
subdivision (f)(3)(I). No abuse of discretion occurred. 
Id. at 518. 
Presented with similar circumstances, other courts have reached the same 
conclusion as in Mearns. In Santiago v. State, 669 So. 2d 334 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) 
(per curiam), the victim, Santiago's daughter, argued with her mother, who hit the 
victim with a log and tried to grab the victim's four-year-old daughter. Id. at 335. 
Santiago was convicted of battery. Id. At the restitution hearing, the "emotionally 
distraught" victim testified that she incurred travel expenses removing her daughter 
from the state because she was afraid her mother would return and kidnap the 
child. Id. The court ordered Santiago to pay restitution to the victim for her travel 
expenses in safekeeping the child. Id. The Florida District Court of Appeals upheld 
the restitution order, concluding that the victim "clearly" suffered a financial loss 
"directly and significantly related to the crimes proved at trial." Id. See also State v. 
Brady, 819 P.2d 1033, 1033 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (holding sexual assault victim's 
moving expenses were "economic loss," and therefore moving expenses could be 
subject of restitution order where victim moved out of apartment where assault had 
22 
taken place because she feared that the defendant might return and do her further 
harm). 
This Court should reach the same conclusion as in Mearns, Santiago, and 
Brady. Here, defendant entered Cheree's residence without permission, in violation 
of a no contact order, and then broke down a door, violently battered Cheree and 
her mother, and later threatened to kill Cheree. R3-4, 27. The prosecutor stated, 
without objection, that Cheree had relocated "out of fear that the Defendant would 
retaliate or come back again after he got out of custody/' R107:12. See State v. Hight, 
Jr., 2008 UT App 118, f 6,182 P.3d 922 (upholding restitution award where victim's 
testimony was unopposed and no record evidence showed that victim's testimony 
was so lacking that "no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial 
court"). Also undisputed is that the "verified expenses incurred by the victim[, 
Cheree Weatherspoon]" were $1,300 for two successive months' rent and $500 in 
rent deposit. R65-66. 
The trial court agreed that restitution for Cheree's relocation costs were 
reasonable under the circumstances. The court noted Defendant's criminal record 
of domestic abuse and assaults, his propensity for violence, and the court's concern 
about the danger Defendant presented to the community and the victim. R107:3-5, 
7-8. The observations of the AP&P investigator and the diagnostic evaluators 
concerning Defendant's difficulties managing anger, his propensity for violence, 
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and his lack of insight into his behavior, see PSL2, 4; DEV/G4-5; DEV/Z:3-5, 
support the trial court's ruling that Cheree's relocation costs were justified. R107:15. 
This Court should uphold that conclusion. 
D. Defendant's arguments that the relocation costs were unrelated to 
his conduct, unsupported by the record, and amounted to "pain 
and suffering" are unsupported in fact and law. 
Defendant challenges the restitution award on several grounds, each of which 
is meritless. 
1. The relocation costs were directly related to defendant's conduct. 
Defendant argues that the relocation costs "are not related to conduct for 
which [he] admitted responsibility," because they "purportedly arose on August 1 
and September 1, several months after the conduct in this case." Aplt. Br. at 17,18. 
However, Defendant was arrested on and booked into jail on January 25,2007, only 
two days after the incident, and he remained in custody until sentencing, on August 
24,2007, after which he was placed on probation and released from custody. Rl, 39-
40, 56; 58-59, DEV/Z:1. Therefore, Cheree had no reason to move before August. 
See Mearns, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 518 (holding that even though victim moved months 
after her assailant arrested, trial court not compelled to conclude that victim moved 
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for some reason other than her fear of "being assaulted again").5 Indeed, the timing 
of Cheree's relocating—she moved as soon as Defendant might be released—shows 
that Defendant's conduct directly led to her move. 
2. The court properly referred to the OCVR's notice to assist it in 
determining restitution. 
Defendant also argues that "the record fails to support the relocation costs" 
on three grounds Aplt. Br. at 19-21. He first argues that the trial court, in 
contravention of UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-25a-403 (West 2004), improperly considered 
the Restitution/Subrogation Notice (attached at Addendum C), attached to the 
State's proposed order for restitution, which detailed the rental and deposit costs for 
which Cheree was reimbursed by the OCVR. Aplt. Br. at 19-20. 
First, because that argument was not preserved in the trial court and 
defendant has not argued plain error on appeal, the Court should decline to 
consider it. See e.g., State v. Person, 2006 UT App 288, \ 10,140 P.3d 584 (declining to 
consider unpreserved claim where neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances 
were argued on appeal). In any case, Defendant's interpretation is mistaken. 
5
 Defendant also argues that his attack was not the cause of Cheree's moving 
because at the restitution hearing the prosecutor said that Cheree's decision to move 
was a "choice." Aplt. Br. at 17 (citing R107:13). Defendant takes out of context, and 
thereby mischaracterizes, the prosecutor's use of the word "choice " to describe 
Cheree's decision to relocate. The prosecutor had, a moment earlier, specifically 
argued that "[Cheree] relocated out of fear that the Defendant would retaliate or 
come back again after he got out of custody." R107:12. 
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Section 63-25a-403 provides that "[t]he court shall not consider a reparations 
award when determining the order of restitution " UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-25a-
403 (2) (West 2004). Defendant apparently interprets this provision to literally mean 
that the court shall not even look at or be aware of the contents of a reparations 
notice. 
Contrary to Defendant's interpretation, the statutory term, "not consider/' is 
not intended to so constrain the sentencing court's access to resources. Rather, the 
term is intended as notice to the court that its discretion in awarding restitution is 
not to be limited by a reparations award, for at least two reasons. First, the Crime 
Victims Reparation Act (CVRA) defines a different scope of recovery for 
compensable expenses, whereas the Crime Victim's Restitution Act does not. 
Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-25a-411 (3) (d), -(g), -(6) (West 2004) (limiting 
reparations award to 66 2 /3 % of loss of wages and support of dependents, and to a 
maximum total of $25,000) with UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302 (2)(a) (West Supp. 
2008) (providing for "complete restitution" of "all losses caused by the defendant"). 
See e.g., State v. Dendy, 520 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn. App. 1994) (recognizing that 
reparations under the statute were limited because provided by public revenues, 
whereas restitution, which reached a broader set of damages, was not). 
Notice to the sentencing court that reparations and restitution should be 
treated differently is made express by the subsection immediately preceding that 
26 
which Defendant relies on: " A reparations award shall not supplant restitution as 
established under Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. . . ." UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 63-25a-403 (1) (West 2004). And newly amended section 63-25a-403(2) 
further clarifies that the section is not meant to deny the sentencing court access to 
relevant resources, but rather to advise the court that its discretion is not to be 
limited by a reparations award. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-7-503 (2) (West Supp. 
2008) (//rThe court may not reduce an order of restitution based on a reparations 
award/') 
Second, the nature of the discretion applied to reparations and restitution is 
different. Reparations awards are processed by hearing officers, hired by the 
director of the OCVR. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-25a-, 407(1), -408(5) (West 2004). 
Restitution is ordered by a judge, appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the 
Senate. Utah Const, art. VIII, § 8. 
In short, section 63-25a-403 (2) does not preclude a sentencing court from 
using a Restitution/Subrogation Notice to assist it in determining a restitution 
order. Here, the State was satisfied that the notice constituted a satisfactory 
accounting of the victim's pecuniary losses, and the court accepted it as such, 
without objection. 
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3. The record supports that the rent deposit was related to rental of a 
new and different residence and that restitution for two months 
rent was reasonable and equitable. 
Defendant also argues that the record does not support the court's order for 
restitution for the rent deposit. Aplt. Br. at 19-21. An alternative ground supports 
the award. "[A]n appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is 
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such 
ground or theory differs from that stated by the [district] court to be the basis of its 
ruling . . . , was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on 
by the lower court/" State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, f 19,147 P.3d 448 (quoting Bailey 
v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f 10, 52 P.3d 1158) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, the Mai court assumed that reparations for the rent deposit were based 
on Cheree's "probably los[ing] the deposit because [Defendant] kicked in the door." 
R107:16. Defendant rightly attacks that assumption as unsupported by the record. 
However, the Restitution/Subrogation Notice refers to "rent deposit/' not in 
relation to Cheree's former residence, but to her new residence. The notice makes 
no mention of a deposit paid to the lessor or owner of the residence where Cheree 
Weatherspoon was attacked. Instead, it states that on August 1,2007, $650.00 was 
paid for rent on the "Anderson Property" and that on the same date, $500.00 was 
paid for a rent deposit on the same property. R66 (Addendum C). In short, the 
record indicates that the "verified expenses or losses incurred by the victim" — 
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Cheree's rent deposit—relate not to her former residence, but to a new, different 
residence. 
Defendant's third ground of objection to the record is that the award for rent 
is arbitrary in its length- two months as opposed to some other period. Aplt. Br. at 
21. 
"'[T]he measure of damages is flexible, allowing trial courts to fashion an 
equitable award to the victim/" Right, Jr., 2008 UT App 118,1 3 (quoting State v. 
Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, | 14, 82 P.3d 211). Having implicitly accepted the 
prosecutor's representation that Cheree relocated out of fear of Defendant's 
retaliation, fully justified by Defendant's undisputed propensity for uncontrollable 
violence, the court ordered Defendant to pay two months rent: "I feel this has been 
[an] absolutely, entirely appropriate area for restitution." R107:15. The award for 
two months rent, a period in which the victim might well continue to fear 
Defendant, wras exceedingly modest and equitable. 
In the same vein, Defendant argues that "the record fails to support that 
Cheree would not have paid rent in August and September, but for Brown's conduct 
in January." Aplt. Br. at 21 (emphasis in original). The record supports precisely 
the opposite. It is undisputed that Cheree lived with her mother in her mother's 
residence. R3. By relocating, Cheree incurred an expense she had not earlier had. 
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In sum, the record fully supports the court's order that Defendant pay 
restitution for Cheree's relocation expenses. 
4. The Crime Victims Restitution Act expressly provides for damages 
for actual economic harm even if they stem from mental injury 
caused by criminal activity. 
Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in accepting the 
prosecutor's assertion that "restitution for relocation costs would compensate the 
victim for fear and loss of safety." Aplt. Br. at 22. "Damages for these purposes," he 
argues, "may be more properly classified as emotional harm or damages for pain 
and suffering" and "are not recoverable in restitution." Id. This argument 
mistakenly conflates the imprecise damages of emotional injury, which are 
admittedly not compensable in restitution, with the strictly pecuniary damages 
which may flow from emotional injury, but which are compensable in restitution. 
As stated, if "complete restitution" is ordered, as in this case, "the court shall 
order that the defendant make restitution" — that "necessary to compensate a victim 
for all losses caused by the defendant. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302(l), -(2) (West 
Supp. 2008). Restitution, however, is limited to "pecuniary damages." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-38a-102(ll) (West Supp. 2008). And "pecuniary damages" are "all 
demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet incurred, which a person could 
recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities . . . but excludes... pain and suffering." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a~ 
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102(6) (West Supp. 2008) (emphasis added). Thus, the Crime Victims Restitution 
Act, expressly distinguishes damages constituting "demonstrable economic injury/' 
which are recoverable in restitution, from damages constituting "pain and 
suffering/' which are not. 
In an opinion that led to the enactment of current section 77-38a-102(6), this 
Court made still clearer the effect this distinction has on the ordering of restitution. 
Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, f f 28 (Greenwood, J., concurring, joined by Orme J.) In 
Corbitt, a majority of the Court discussed former section 77-38a-102(6)'s anomalous 
use of the terms "special damages" and "general damages" to denote what damages 
were compensable in restitution. Id. at f f 18-28. Judge Greenwood clarified that 
the Legislature's undoubted intention was "to exclude from the scope of restitution" 
the "less tangible elements of damage" like "pain and suffering" or "emotional 
harm." Id. at f 27. "In the case of certain dignitary invasions, such as . . . assaults,. 
.. the injury done is often not an economic one at all...," and "'general damages/ 
[normally recoverable in such a case,] does not refer to a measure [of damages] at 
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all." Id. (emphasis added).6 These damages, however, are " distinguish [able] from 
[damages following] proof of actual economic harm, . . . the actual amount of 
money that should be awarded/7 Id. The Legislature's adoption of the Court's 
equating " demonstrable pecuniary loss" with "actual pecuniary harm," see id. at \ 
28, indicates that the Legislature approved of the distinctions made in Corbitt. 
Indeed, the Act implicitly announces this policy by authorizing restitution for the 
"cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to. 
.. mental health care . . . . " See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302(5)(b)(ii) (West Supp. 
2008). See State v. Miller, 2007 UT App 332, 13 n.5,170 P.3d 1141 (Utah App. 2007) 
(implicitly distinguishing damages for "pain and suffering" from "economic losses" 
stemming from same injury in explaining scope of Utah's no-fault insurance 
statutes) (citation omitted); Brady, 819 P.2d at 1033 ("If the cost of psychological 
counseling for the victim of a violent crime is directly attributable to the crime, so 
are moving expenses incurred in an effort to restore the victim's equanimity."); State 
6
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 cmt. c (1965) ("The principal 
element of damages in actions for battery [and] assault . . . is frequently the 
disagreeable emotion experienced by the plaintiff."); PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 9 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds. 1984) (" [T]he establishment of the tort 
cause of action [of battery] entitles the plaintiff also to compensation for the 
resulting mental disturbance, such as fright. . . ."); id. at § 10 ("Since assault, as 
distinguished from battery, is essentially a mental rather than a physical invasion, it 
follows that the damages recoverable for it are those for the plaintiffs mental 
disturbance, including fright .. . ."). 
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v. Behnke, 553 N.W.2d 265, 272-73 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding restitution for 
purchase of dead bolt "to help [victim] feel safe after Behnke's attack" and holding 
that while "general damages" for "pain and suffering" were unavailable under 
restitution statute, "any specific expenditure paid out because of the crime . . . is 
appropriate) (citation omitted); State v. Fleming, 480 A.2d 107,110-11 (N.H. 1984) 
(citations omitted) (observing that definition of "economic loss" is limited by phrase 
"pecuniary detriment;" therefore, only losses easily ascertained and measured, i.e., 
only liquidated amounts, should be recoverable under statute; hospital bills, value 
of property, and lost employment income resulting from offender's criminal acts are 
easily ascertainable; damages for pain and suffering, loss of earning capacity, and 
wrongful death, as contemplated by statute, are not) (citations omitted). 
In short, the Act contemplates that restitution shall be ordered for those 
clearly ascertainable economic losses that can be denominated in dollar amounts, 
even though they might flow from emotional injury. Cases cited by defendant, see 
Aplt. Br. at 19, 22, have declined to acknowledge that distinction. 
Here, the prosecution did not request and the trial court did not order that 
Defendant pay restitution for either emotional injury or pain and suffering. Rather, 
the court ordered restitution only for Cheree's pecuniary damages — those precisely 
denominated relocation costs resulting from what she could have recovered in a 
civil action for battery or assault, in the amount of $1,800. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the trial court's ruling on 
restitution, but remand the case to correct the judgment to show that Defendant was 
convicted of burglary. 
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Addendum A 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-25a-403 (West 2004). Restitution-Reparations not to 
supplant restitution— Assignment of claim for restitution judgment to Reparations 
Office 
(1) A reparations award shall not supplant restitution as established under Title 77, 
Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act, or as established by any other provisions. 
(2) The court shall not consider a reparations award when determining the order of 
restitution nor when enforcing restitution. 
(3) If, due to reparation payments to a victim, the Reparations Office is assigned under 
Section 63-25a-419 a claim for the victim's judgment for restitution or a portion of the 
restitution, the Reparations Office may file with the sentencing court a notice of the 
assignment. The notice of assignment shall be signed by the victim and a Reparations 
Officer and shall state the amount of the claim assigned. 
(4) Upon conviction and sentencing of the defendant, the court shall enter a civil 
judgment for complete restitution as provided in Section 77-38a-401 and identify the 
Reparations Office as the assignee of the assigned portion of the judgment. 
(5) If the notice of assignment is filed after sentencing, the court shall modify the civil 
judgment for restitution to identify the Reparations Office as the assignee of the assigned 
portion of the judgment. 
Laws 1986, c. 150, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 46, § 3; Laws 1993, c. 72, § 2; Laws 1996, c. 242, 
§ 34, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2000, c. 235, § 2, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 2, 
eff. May 6, 2002. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-25a-408 (West 2004). Reparations officers 
The reparations officers shall in addition to any assignments made by the director of the 
Reparations Office: 
(1) hear and determine all matters relating to claims for reparations and reinvestigate or 
reopen claims without regard to statutes of limitation or periods of prescription; 
(2) obtain from prosecuting attorneys, law enforcement officers, and other criminal 
justice agencies, investigations and data to enable the reparations officer to determine 
whether and to what extent a claimant qualifies for reparations; 
(3) hold hearings, administer oaths or affirmations, examine any person under oath or 
affirmation, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and giving of testimony of 
witnesses, require the production of any books, papers, documents, or other evidence 
which may contribute to the reparations officer's ability to determine particular reparation 
awards; 
(4) determine who is a victim or dependent; 
(5) award reparations or other benefits determined to be due under this chapter and the 
rules of the board; 
(6) take notice of judicially recognized facts and general, technical, and scientific facts 
within their specialized knowledge; 
(7) advise and assist the board in developing policies recognizing the rights, needs, and 
interests of crime victims; 
(8) render periodic reports as requested by the board concerning: 
(a) the officers' activities; and 
(b) the manner in which the rights, needs, and interests of crime victims are being 
addressed by the state's criminal justice system; 
(9) establish priorities for assisting elderly victims of crime or those victims 
facing extraordinary hardships; 
(10) cooperate with the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice to develop 
information regarding crime victims' problems and programs; and 
(11) assist the director in publicizing the provisions of the Crime Victims' Reparations 
Act, [FN1] including the procedures for obtaining reparation, and in encouraging law 
enforcement agencies, health providers, and other related officials to take reasonable care 
to ensure that victims are informed about the provisions of this chapter and the procedure 
for applying for reparation. 
Laws 1986, c. 150, § 2; Laws 1991, c. 84, § 4; Laws 1993, c. 72, § 5; Laws 1996, c. 242, 
§39,eff. April 29, 1996. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-25a-411 (West 2004). Compensable losses and amounts 
A reparations award under this chapter may be made if: 
(1) the reparations officer finds the claim satisfies the requirements for the award under 
the provisions of this chapter and the rules of the board; 
(2) monies are available in the fund; 
(3) the person for whom the award of reparations is to be paid is otherwise eligible under 
this act; 
(4) the claim is for an allowable expense incurred by the victim, as follows: 
(a) reasonable and necessary charges incurred for products, services, and 
accommodations; 
(b) inpatient and outpatient medical treatment and physical therapy, subject to 
rules promulgated by the board pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act; 
(c) mental health counseling which: 
(i) is set forth in a mental health treatment plan which has been approved 
prior to any payment by a reparations officer; and 
(ii) qualifies within any further rules promulgated by the board pursuant to 
Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act; 
(d) actual loss of past earnings and anticipated loss of future earnings because of a 
death or disability resulting from the personal injury at a rate not to exceed 66-
2/3% of the person's weekly gross salary or wages or the maximum amount 
allowed under the state workers' compensation statute; 
(e) care of minor children enabling a victim or spouse of a victim, but not both of 
them, to continue gainful employment at a rate per child per week as determined 
under rules established by the board; 
(f) funeral and burial expenses for death caused by the criminally injurious 
conduct, subject to rules promulgated by the board pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 
46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act; 
(g) loss of support to the dependent or dependents not otherwise compensated for 
a pecuniary loss for personal injury, for as long as the dependence would have 
existed had the victim survived, at a rate not to exceed 66-2/3% of the person's 
weekly salary or wages or the maximum amount allowed under the state workers' 
compensation statute, whichever is less; 
(h) personal property necessary and essential to the health or safety of the victim 
as defined by rules promulgated by the board pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act; and 
(i) medical examinations as defined in Section 63-25a-402, subject to rules 
promulgated by the board pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, which may allow for exemptions from 
Sections 63-25a-409, 63-25a-412, and 63-25a-413. 
(5) If a Utah resident suffers injury or death as a result of criminally injurious conduct 
inflicted in a state, territory, or country that does not provide a reciprocal crime victims' 
compensation program, the Utah resident has the same rights under this chapter as if the 
injurious conduct occurred in this state. 
(6) An award of reparations shall not exceed $25,000 in the aggregate unless the victim is 
entitled to proceeds in excess of that amount as provided in Subsection 77-38a-403(2). 
However, reparations for actual medical expenses incurred as a result of homicide, 
attempted homicide, aggravated assault, or DUI offenses, may be awarded up to $50,000 
in the aggregate. 
Laws 1993, c. 72. § 8; Laws 1995, c. 75, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 242, § 42, 
eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 308, § 13, eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 2000, c. 235, § 7, 
eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 3, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2002, c. 256, § 51, eff. 
July 1,2002. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-7-503 (West Supp. 2008). Restitution-Reparations not to 
supplant restitution— Assignment of claim for restitution judgment to Reparations 
Office 
(1) A reparations award may not supplant restitution as established under Title 77, 
Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act, or as established by any other provisions. 
(2) The court may not reduce an order of restitution based on a reparations award. 
(3) If, due to reparation payments to a victim, the Office of Crime Victim Reparations is 
assigned under Section 63M-7-519 a claim for the victim's judgment for restitution or a 
portion of the restitution, the office may file with the sentencing court a notice of the 
assignment. The notice of assignment shall be signed by the victim and a reparations 
officer and shall state the amount of the claim assigned. 
(4) Upon conviction and sentencing of the defendant, the court shall enter a civil 
judgment for complete restitution as provided in Section 77-38a-401 and identify the 
office as the assignee of the assigned portion of the judgment. 
(5) If the notice of assignment is filed after sentencing, the court shall modify the civil 
judgment for restitution to identify the office as the assignee of the assigned portion of 
the judgment. 
Laws 2008, c. 339, § 7, eff. July 1, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 1967, eff. May 5, 2008. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-101 (West 2004). Title 
This chapter is known as the "Crime Victims Restitution Act." 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-102 (West Supp. 2008). Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Conviction" includes a: 
(a) judgment of guilt; 
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
(c) a plea of no contest. 
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any 
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing 
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the 
condition that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make 
restitution to the victim, or fulfill some other condition. 
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a prosecution. 
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet 
incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events 
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair market value of 
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost 
earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain 
and suffering. 
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and defendant 
setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon which the 
defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest. 
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the 
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that 
time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on 
condition that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance 
agreement. 
(9) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the 
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which, 
following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance. 
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and 
defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or any 
agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or where 
charges are dismissed without a plea. 
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a 
victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment for 
expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as may be further 
defined by law. 
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money: 
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction of an 
offender; and 
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information, except 
that the person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an accomplice, 
or a bounty hunter. 
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to the 
public. 
(13) "Screening* means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate 
investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that has 
been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted. 
(14)(a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 3, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 278, § 2, eff. May 5, 2003; 
Laws 2005, c. 96, § 3, eff. May 2, 2005. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302 (West Supp. 2008). Restitution criteria 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct 
for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For 
purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-3 8a-102(14) 
and in determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria 
and procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-
ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for 
all losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal 
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the 
time of sentencing or within one year after sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as 
provided in Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part, 
the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, 
the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include 
any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the 
defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an element a 
scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly 
harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the 
court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or 
destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices 
relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and 
treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law 
of the place of treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted 
in bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due 
to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by 
the victim and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the 
offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the 
death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered 
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of 
restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on 
other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the 
method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution 
inappropriate. 
(d)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at the 
time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing. 
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one 
year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer an 
order of judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of restitution. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 8, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 13, eff. May 6, 2002; 
Laws 2002, c. 185, § 51, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 285, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; 
Laws 2005, c. 96, § 5, eff. May 2, 2005. 
Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. ERRORS AND DEFECTS 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights 
of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the 
record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and 
after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
IN TBDE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILES r'fT^fTrc^etT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Pla in t i f f , S A A L ^ COLMV 
By l^CC£l_. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
fJ-'nuty ClerK 
vs. Case No. 011^07 7j F3 
Arnrttrl UiAnnzfl Browr). 
Defendant 
I, ArmQKYl U M M T J Q 6rOWn. hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been 
advised of and that I understand tihe following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty (o^te-eeetest) to the following crimes: 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
PwnlQjrv 
(Xrjjmiltri /w=/iu L 
Degree 
TMm 
Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
y 
Qjrfharnp T 
cM\t aorees to ditmi5e> COUnb H ^ and Ca^ *0Tiqo07to^5 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am 
pleading guilty (ef-so contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (er no contest) are: 
(A)Te rlefrnflflnf m\nrd or mncnn^ (iniri\\)-piiK/ m ^he dvMHUm 
r£ mrtVrr yvHh w\ftr\i \r> rnmmit Qtt)U\t 
ffhSft drihvlanr ihrenimed wifh ^e d Mfth\\jfiiJ -force Onittm 
jfwiiKi \n\\im to nnr t l r r . ^L todily injury to am\xr 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading uo luulesL, 1 am uul wntesto-g that I-e-eaartted-^fat 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (OF, if I am pleading no contest, I do net-dispute or 
costes$}-that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for 
which I am criminally Hable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty 
(oj^ Bbe-contrst) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (OF-
no contest):~ 
(\\ gftO,3) Souih Adams ^ i w i , in f> 1 A
 t IHTIA cm or atmt 
I7innnry ??> 3rtff7 /frmrt/ttl l ^ n y f l ftrrmin fhfrreri fh r 
W I T C4 h)4 niYlfrienri iAiilhm/f npfmiss)/rr> fl/ori art- m a 
flnhf Writ) haf mftilyr QpnrxQ W ^ h ^ p O f l t o ^ r p r a i f f l 
o^ i i f f) her Vkirvi ' o 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I imderstand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead 
guilty (opae-eostest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand 
2 
that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed 
lawyer's sendee to me. 
I mave no$) (hsvc) waived my right to counsel. If I have waive d-my right to counsel! 
• I KSyggeae so knowingly, mLclligendy, and voluntarily for the following leasuns: 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I cgj^ Fy t^hat I have read this statement and that 
I understand the nature and elements ofjhe<E^ges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest). I also undei^tsfa my rights in this case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty-(f)fno contest) plea(s). 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is \JhY)ifr]\l lApIfifk . 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of 
my guilty (G^^axrcc^st) plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (e¥3»©s«©stes£).. 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a 
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and 
b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to 
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses 
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony 
of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would 
pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to 
have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose 
not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also 
know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal 
to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. 1 know that if I do not plead guilty 
(orae-contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged 
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my 
case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each 
3 
element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt If the trial is before a jury, the verdict 
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (ax^e^aoateg^ I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the 
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (oj^8=ea^gi). I understand that if I wish 
to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is 
entered. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (cn=-^ -€:B:ntE5T) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (op r^e=e©©test). LfaTOWttarty^ 
coB£dst)4Q.~ajC3iii^  subjeUiutHBayself to sening 
a masrdeteiy-peBalfy^eF-^ I knowr my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or 
both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any \ictim(s) of my 
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of 
a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run 
at the same tune (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each 
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing 
on another offense of which I have been convicted or wrhich I have plead guilty (ofcao 
CQgfest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was 
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate. 
4 
Plea agreement. My guilty (o^^^^^^est^t) plea(s^is/are^is/are not) the result of 
a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorneyT^ll the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those 
explained below: 
->e pay am 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (6£*e«^8fe£t). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to 
change or ddttt anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am '2h years of age. I have attended school through the V 1/ grade. I can read 
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I wras not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which 
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea, I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing 
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
5 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (of^afesw^^t) plea(s), I must 
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand-
that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to witlidiawfrom the plea agreement uiust'be 
marip wifbi" <^il^>yf^»rjilfv^ilhiu ^nlliy m inr^H^gf I
 wni only be allowed to withdraw 
my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any 
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Dated this i Z r day of [VlfWll . 200J. 
OMMJX^J Qi« 
DEFENDANT 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for k\r\Qfd U\mmO fomWn . the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of 
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are 
accurate and true. 
/ I ; 
ATTORNEY $OR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. f ^ 
6 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
, defendant I have reviewed this Statement of 
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion 
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained 
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before 
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the 
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
BarNo.^g^O 
7 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, 
knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this (L day of {MH-^ .200*7. 
Form revised 6/25/03 
Addendum C 
Addendum C 
£1,1 £ _ U d U U I 1 1 1 U U U ' J U 1111 k-»w M l l b i t - l U Y L - i w u . A W L -
- -~w,i iwu WC'QI j ' ui uiune viunn KtF 
JONM. HUNTSMAN, X* 
CrOWJTWr 
OAKYILHBK3EfcT 
FAX Nf 1015334127 
State of Utah 
OFJ-1CE OF CRIME VICTIM REPARATIONS 
RON/ U> U. QOPPQN, JB-
Dtnek ", CKA 
P. 02/05 
BROOKE ST JOHN Restitution/ 
FAX: 412-3601 7 ? , „ . Subrogation Notice 
September 11, 2007 
Suspects: Brown. Am ?wd Kwanr-a 
Date of Crime; 0117 3/2007 
Type of Crime- ——Asss ttW^rrr--^. 
Victim: ^heree We*i ^ JhstspooS"^) 
Crime Location:~^2Krj! ^cdam^trSouth Salt Lake Ojy 
Police Report. 07G0006Q9 
Refer to CVR Claim 1556J 2 
In accordance with Utah Cude Annotated 1987, Chapter S\, the Office of Crime Victim 
Reparations is hereby giving notice that the State is subrogated to all the claimant/victim's rights 
to receive or recover benefits or advantages for economic lass for which reparations ore 
awarded. 
The following represents verified expenses or losses incurifod bv the victWclaimant which 
have been reimbursed by it ts office to date. 
Medical S989J4 
Rent $1,300.00 
Rent Deposit $500.00 
Total Reimbursed to Dale: 
You will be infenncd of anv further award made by this ailfca. 
52,789.74 
Huber 
Repartition OiScer 
(801)538-2364 
350 East 500 South, Suite 200, Sal. La&e City, Utah 84111 
telephone 8G1-23S-2&6Q • facainaU 801-5S3-4L27 * 1-8QQ-621-744I • wwwxrimenctim.utak.gcjv 
LE, 
SEP-20-2007 THU 08:59 AN SO SAL I LftKt KJLlUt *HA NU, 1 ttUi 4i£ 3DU1T 
hRX NC 1015334127 
r. uo 
P. 03/Q& 
September 11,2007 
Case Number RE:lSi612 
List of Payments 
Page 
Officar JoAnnHuber 
Victim Cheree Woatherspoon 
Address 
Svc Date Lois Type CPT Billed Code Adjustment Ins. Paid 
Num 1 Date 08/D3/2007 Provider Andcrion P| opart? 
08/01/2007 Rent Deposit SSOO.Oli 
0^01/2007 Rent SSSQ.rl 
Niim 2 Date O8/„0/2O07 Provider Anderson Pi pporty 
09/01/2007 Rem $650,01 
Nuin 3 Date 08/! 3/2007 Provider Cold Crois J.mbulDnce 
01/23/2007 Medical A0429 $989 71 
$o,oo 
50.00 
(9,00 
$0 00 
Paid To 
so.oo 
S0.0D 
Peld To 
so.oo 
Paid To 
$0 00 
Provider 
ssoooo 
S650.OD 
S14SO.00 
Provider 
$650.00 
S6SG.O0 
Provider 
S989.74 
$989.74 
Total Paid to Providers $2,789.74 To Cjaimanf $0.00 
lo 
FAX NC 1015334127 P. 04/05 
JON M, HUNTSMAN, JR. 
GARY *L HERBERT 
State of Utah 
OFJlCg OF CiOME VICTIM lEPABATIONS 
RON, (JOB. GORDON, JR. 
BROOKE ST JOHN 
FAX: 412-360! Restitution/ Subrogation Notice 
September 11, 2007 
Suspects: Brown, Aro sand Kwanza 
Date of Crime: 02/21/20D7 
Type of Crim£>-^--—Agg awte^Assauit 
Victim: T Spring Weai herspoon 
Crime LocationT^—fHQz Adaigts^ StTSouih Salt Lake 
Police Report: 07G00609 
Refer to CVR Claim i 55613 
In accordance with Utah G *de Annotated X9S7F Chapter 6L the Office of Crime Victim 
Reparations is hereby givin j notice that the State is subrogited to all the claimant/victim's rights 
to receive or recover benefils or advantages for economic ibss for which reparations are 
awarded. 
Tho following represents vi nfied expenses or losses ineuqfsd £>y mc victim/olaimani which 
have been reimbursed by tfc s office to date. 
Medical $180.98 
Totsrt Reimbursed to I>a| p: 
You wjll be informed of an; further award made by this oil ice, 
S1S0.98 
incdje 
1| Huber 
Repalition Officer 
(801)238-2364 
850 East 500 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah &i!U 
telephone 801-2S8-2S6Q • fiammiiB 80V53S-4127 - 1-B0Q-621-7414 * w\w.crimevictiin utfch.gov 
/l-i 
ShP-2U-2UUf THU Ub'.bd HII b'U bHLI LHM: r u L i u n rtiA nu. 1 ou i mc J U U I T I , UJ 
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Case Number RE:155613 Officer JoAnnHuber 
Victim Spring '^ eaxhsrspoon Home 
A44ress "" " 
Work 
SycDate Lews Type CPT BUIeei Code Adjustment Ins, Paid 
Num 1 Date 08/:i/2D07 Provider Gold CrowifmbuUmct Paid To Provider 
01/23/2007 Medical A0427 &989.7K *0-00 $808.76 ?ifiG_9g 
S180.98 
Total Paid to Provider? S1WL98 To qiaimaiwt $0>00 
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